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We utilize an overlapping generations model with endogenous production and incomplete 
markets to quantify the distortionary costs associated with financing the increase in 
government expenditures directed to investments in the private sector in 2008 and 2009 (also 
known as ‘the bailout’), and its differential impact on different groups of the population (in 
the USA). In our baseline calibration, this distortion corresponds to a loss of approximately 
$300 billion dollars in total household consumption. For plausible alternative assumptions 
regarding both the expected and actual duration of this increase in expenditures, or the 
willingness of foreign institutions and/or investors in absorbing additional government 
debt, this number can increase to $800 billion. We find that the cost falls more dramatically 
on those households which are either older and/or wealthier. Retirees face approximately 
50% of the cost, as younger agents still expect to be alive when the economy has returned to 
its steady-state. Across wealth groups, the top 25% of the wealth distribution bears almost 
two thirds of the cost. 
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1 Introduction
The years of 2008 and 2009 were characterized by unprecedented major investments on the part
of several OECD governments into private sector companies. In the USA these investments were
particularly sizeable. First, there were signiﬁcant investments by the US government on an indi-
vidual basis in multiple ﬁnancial ﬁrms such as Fannie May ($34B), Freddie Mac ($51B), and AIG
($70B). Second, as part of an organized eﬀort to repair capital ratios, hundreds of banks received
substantial infusions in the form of preferred stock adding up to a total of over $200B (the TARP
program).1 Finally, there was also a non-trivial investment of $83B in the automotive industry
(GM, Chrysler, their ﬁnance arms and part suppliers), and substantial investments made by the
Federal Reserve in debt and mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
This set of expenditures became publicly known as ‘the bailout’.
Naturally these investments have prompted an important discussion on the costs and beneﬁts
of such interventions. It is not the goal of our paper to oﬀer a comprehensive evaluation of all those
costs and beneﬁts. Our goal is a more modest yet still very important one: to provide a quantitative
assessment of one important source of costs associated with these interventions: the distortionary
impact of the changes in taxation and government debt required to ﬁnance those investments. To
the extent that our results identify distortionary costs in the order of 200 to 800 billion dollars
(in the USA), these should be viewed as one element in the computation of an overall net present
value of ‘the bailout’. If the value of all other beneﬁts minus all other costs is less (more) than our
number, then this net present value should be viewed as negative (positive).
It is important to mention that we only consider government expenditures directly related to
investments in the corporate sector. We explicitly exclude all elements of the stimulus package
which were directly aimed at increasing household-level net worth and consumption, such as the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, or even the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (which also
includes some infrastructure investments). Naturally, including these expenditures would increase
our measure of the distortionary cost, but those interventions are not so unusual in periods of reces-
sion, and here we are only interested in the less orthodox measure: government capital investments
and related expenditures.
Government investments need to be ﬁnanced, either by increases in government debt or increases
in taxes, or both.2 Both of these policy options have distortionary costs on the economy, and our
1While some major banks were allowed to repay these investments relatively quickly, the majority still remained
in the support program throughout 2009.
2Another option, which was also used during the crisis, relies on signiﬁcant increase of the money supply. This is
typically viewed as a last resort, because of inﬂationary fears. Most developed countries have therefore avoided this2
goal is to measure these distortions in the context of the government interventions of 2008 and
2009. We ﬁnd non-trivial values for these costs. After calibrating an overlapping-generations
DSGE model with incomplete markets and heterogenous agents to the US economy we ﬁnd, in
our baseline calculation, a distortionary impact of these ﬁscal decisions equivalent to a one time
loss of 2.75% of aggregate consumption, approximately $300 billion US dollars. Depending on the
exact assumptions on how we discount future gains and losses, the exact number changes, but very
marginally. Naturally, the magnitude of the cost will depend on the duration of the ﬁscal shock,
which is not currently known. As we increase the expected duration, our calculations rapidly
increase to more than 6% of annual consumption ($600 billion dollars).
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the cost falls disproportionately on those households which are either
older and/or wealthier. If we equally weight the percentage consumption losses of all agents in
the economy, retirees face approximately 50% of the cost. After a few years of higher output
and consumption, due to the initial public investment, the crowding out eﬀects start to dominate
and the distortionary eﬀects of the ﬁscal expansion will still be noticeable in the economy for
approximately two to three decades. Therefore, during a signiﬁcant fraction of their remaining
lives, retirees are faced with the prospect of lower capital accumulation due to the crowding out
eﬀect of taxes. On the other hand, younger agents still expect to be alive when the economy has
returned to its steady-state, and therefore their remaining life-time wealth is less aﬀected. If we
perform the same calculation across wealth groups, the top 25% of the wealth distribution bears
almost 2/3 of the cost. Interestingly, the impact on middle class households is relatively uniform,
regardless of whether they are stockholders or not, and not much higher than the impact on the
poorer households. This is driven by the high concentration of wealth among the right tail of the
distribution, and highlights the importance of capturing this feature of the data within the model,
a point which we will re-empashize below.
Currently, a signiﬁcant fraction of US government bonds is being held by non-US investors and
institutions (e.g. other central banks). However, it is not clear how much additional US debt these
investors will be willing to absorb. Some of them have in fact already suggested that they would
not be interested in increasing their holdings much further. This is naturally one crucial element
for determining the economic impact of the ﬁscal expansion program, and consequently the ﬁscal
form of ﬁnancing other than in extraordinary circumstances. Throughout 2008 and 2009, the US Federal Reserve
has substantially increased the provision of loans to companies and ﬁnancial institutions and widened the range of
ﬁnancial securities it accepted as collateral for those loans. It also provided ﬁnancing for the bulk of the GSE-issued
mortgage-backed securities and GSE debt. In addition, the Fed supported a program of purchasing treasury debt
which began to wind down at the end of summer 2009. Later in the paper, when we calibrate the magnitude of
government intervention in capital markets, we will discuss the Fed’s expenditures in more detail.3
distortion that it implies. As we consider alternative scenarios, where foreign investors are less
willing to buy additional US bonds, the increase in domestic interest rates and the decrease in
private investment are both naturally much larger. In those settings, the total distortionary impact
is now closer to one trillion US dollars.
We conduct our analysis using a detailed DSGE model which captures reasonably well many im-
portant features of aggregate economic variables and cross-sectional behavior of households. More
precisely, we consider an overlapping-generations general equilibrium production-economy model
with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents and limited stock market participation. A pro-
duction economy set-up is obviously crucial since we want to measure the impact of government
decisions on investment and capital accumulation. As discussed in Aiyagari (1994) or Castaneda
et al. (2003), for example, market incompleteness is crucial to match the wealth distribution in
the data with a realistic calibration of the underlying structural parameters.3 Capturing this dis-
tribution is very important for providing an accurate assessment of the household-level responses
to the ﬁscal policy decisions, and for allowing us to study the diﬀerential impact of ﬁscal interven-
tions across realistically calibrated heterogeneous groups of households (see Domeij and Heathcote
(2004)). Finally, considering an overlapping-generations model provides us with a set-up to study
the diﬀerential impact across age cohorts.4
The magnitude and importance of multiple ‘government bailouts’ across several countries has
generated a growing number of academic papers analyzing government actions in response to the
ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 2008/2009. Naturally, there is an even larger literature analyzing
the causes and consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-2009, but our work belongs in the ﬁrst
group. We take the ﬁnancial crisis as given and analyze the distortionary impact of the government
intervention in this context.5 Existing papers have focused on alternative aspects of the stimulus,
3In our economy markets are incomplete due to aggregate uncertainty, idiosyncratic productivity shocks and
limited stock market participation. The idiosyncratic shocks are not perfectly diversiﬁable due to the presence of
borrowing constraints. These are features that have been identiﬁed as important for matching quantitatively the
wealth distribution.
4It is important to mention that, following a standard practice of neoclassical macroeconomics we do not include
an explicit ﬁnancial sector in the model. It is true that a signiﬁcant portion of government investments occurred in
the ﬁnancial sector, but given our focus on the distortionary impact of the government ﬁscal intervention, it is hard
to see the beneﬁt of modeling directly the sectors that received funding (or any bias in our analysis as a result of not
doing this), which would then also have to include the insurance and automotive sectors.
5Not all government interventions in the private markets during the crisis were accompanied by direct capital
investments. For example, Veronesi and Zingales (2009) consider an episode which did not involve immediate
increased spending or ﬁscal distortions. They compute the costs and beneﬁts of government guarantees of private
bank debts using CDS pricing data and conclude that the guarantees represented a transfer of wealth from taxpayers
to banks through the reduction of bankruptcy probabilities. However, the total eﬀect of the intervention was positive
creating a net present value of almost $100 billion dollars.4
mostly in the US. Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2009) and Hall (2009) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of economic stimulus on GDP and employment.
They compare the eﬀects of a ﬁscal stimulus and reach diﬀerent conclusions. Cogan et al. (2009)
conclude that the eﬀect of the stimulus is likely to be small, while the other two papers ﬁnd it to be
potentially quite large. We diﬀer from these papers by looking at the eﬀect of capital investments
ﬁnanced by the government, not government consumption expenditures per se, and we are interested
in the distortionary impact of debt and taxes used to ﬁnance capital investment expenditures.6
To the extent that we consider the impact of tax changes, our paper complements the recent
study by Barro and Redlick (2009). They construct a marginal tax rates series for the U.S. and use
it to empirically determine how a change in the marginal tax rate aﬀects macroeconomic variables.
They ﬁnd that reducing the marginal tax rate by one percentage point raises next year’s GDP
growth by around 0.6% per year. Our quantitative experiments focussing on raising the marginal
tax rate on capital income are broadly consistent with their estimates.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the ﬁscal policy variables and
their behavior, while section 3 describes the calibration. Section 4 reports the baseline unconditional
results of the model economy that is being used to conduct the experiments. Section 5 presents
the responses to the ﬁscal expansion in the context of our baseline calibration, while section 6
considers alternative scenarios. Section 7 provides the concluding remarks. Technical details of the
computational procedure are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model Economy
The model is solved at an annual frequency. Households have a ﬁnite horizon divided in two main
phases: working life and retirement. During working life they receive a wage income subject to
uninsurable shocks, and against which they cannot borrow. At retirement they receive a pension,
ﬁnanced by taxes on current workers’ wages. There are two types of agents: non-stockholders and
stockholders. The former can only invest in riskless government bonds, while stockholders can also
invest in claims to the risky capital stock (equity).
Firms are perfectly competitive, and combine capital and labor, using a constant returns to
scale technology, to produce a non-durable consumption good. The government taxes wages, capital
gains and consumption expenditures (sales) to ﬁnance government expenditures (including capital
6For the same reason, our paper diﬀers from the recent literature that uses structural VARs (for instance, Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) or Ramey (2009)) or variants of new Keynesian models (for example, Gali et. al. (2007))
to analyze ﬁscal policy shocks.5
investments) and the interest payments on public debt. As previously discussed, and following the
standard practice in ﬁscal policy models, we do not include a ﬁnancial sector. For the purpose of




The technology in the economy is characterized by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function,





where K is the total capital stock in the economy, L is the total labor supply, and Z is a stochastic
productivity which follows the process
Zt = GtUt, Gt =( 1+g)
t
Secular growth in the economy is determined by the constant g (>0), while the productivity shocks
Ut are stochastic.
Firms make decisions after observing aggregate shocks. Therefore, they solve a sequence of static
maximization problems with no uncertainty, and factor prices (wages, Wt, and return on capital,
RK
t ) are given by the ﬁrst-order conditions






1−α − δt (3)
where δt is a stochastic depreciation rate, as discussed in the next section.
2.1.2 Stochastic depreciation
Standard frictionless production economies cannot generate suﬃcient return volatility, since agents
can adjust their investment plans to smooth consumption over time (see Jermann (1998) or Boldrin,
7This is equivalent to the labor-augmenting formulation
Yt = Kα
t (  ZtLt)1−α
with Zt =(  Zt)1−α, we just need to consider a diﬀerent normalization factor to obtain stationary variables.6
Christiano and Fisher (2001)). This usually motivates adjustment costs for capital, which create
ﬂuctuations in the price of capital and increase return volatility. Since we have incomplete markets,
stockholders stochastic discount factors are not equalized, and they will therefore disagree on the
solution to the optimal intertemporal decision problem of the ﬁrm (see Grossman and Hart (1979)).
This is not a concern here because there is no intertemporal dimension to the ﬁrm’s problem, but
introducing adjustment costs would change that. Recent papers with production economies and
incomplete markets have therefore captured the eﬀect of adjustment costs by assuming a stochastic
depreciation rate for capital (e.g. Gomes and Michaelides (2008), Storesletten et al. (2007), Krueger
and Kubler (2006), and Gottardi and Kubler (2004)). Here we follow the same route and assume
that the depreciation rate is given by
δt = δ + s × ηt (4)
where ηt is a two-point approximation to an i.i.d. standard normal, and s is a scalar. Therefore, δt
is a general measure of economic depreciation, combining physical depreciation, adjustment costs,
capital utilization and investment-speciﬁc productivity shocks.8
2.2 Government sector
We deﬁne two diﬀerent periods of government ”behavior” in our economy: normal periods and
periods of ﬁscal intervention. In normal periods the government simply ﬁnances government con-
sumption and interest payments on pre-existing bonds, with tax rates that are kept constant. So,
the government does not own any capital and the supply of bonds is also kept constant at a “nor-
mal” level. In periods of ﬁscal intervention, the government expands the supply of bonds to ﬁnance
investments in the private sector (capital purchases), and this is followed by an increase in taxes in
order to pay the interest on the additional debt. These additional investments will only occur in
response to negative economic shocks, and will persist for a while, until the government decides to
revert the bond supply (and taxes) back to the “normal” level.
2.2.1 Budget Constraint
To facilitate the exposition, let us ﬁrst consider the government’s budget constraint in the absence
of governmentally-owned capital stock. In such an economy we would have
(1 + R
B
t )Bt + G
c
t = Tt + Bt+1 (5)
8We assume that ηt is uncorrelated with the productivity shock Ut since, as shown by Gomes and Michaelides
(2008), introducing (moderate) correlation between these two variables would have a negligble impact on results.7
where Gc is government consumption, B is public debt, RB is the interest rate on government
bonds, and T denotes tax revenues. Tax proceeds arise from proportional taxation on capital (tax
rate τK), proportional taxation on bond income (τB), proportional taxation on labor (tax rate τL)
and a proportional consumption tax (tax rate τC).9 Labor taxes are non-distortionary in our model
because there is no household labor-leisure decision. As a result we will simply refer to them as
lump-sum taxes, which is what they eﬀectively are.10
Now we can extend the previous budget constraint to include state-owned capital. More pre-
cisely, denoting state-owned capital by KG
t , equation (5) is replaced with
(1 + R
B
t )Bt + G
c








t )( 6 )
where we take into account two additional elements. First, part of the government’s increases
(decreases) in tax rates and bonds are being used to increase (decrease) its investments in physical
capital. Second, the government also earns a return on the capital stock that it (potentially) owns.11
2.2.2 Interventions: transition probabilities
As previously discussed, in the model the government might choose to issue government bonds
to stimulate the economy, by investing the proceeds in additional capital stock. This will then
be followed by an increase in taxes to ﬁnance the interest on those bonds. Therefore, both the
tax rate on capital and the supply of government bonds are stochastic variables. Each of these
is characterized by two potential states: a “normal” state and an “intervention” state. In the
“normal” state the capital income tax rate (τK,t)i se q u a lt oτK, but it can increase by ∆τ (i.e.
to τK,t = τK +∆ τ) according to a set of conditional probabilities: Πτ. Likewise, bond supply
alternates between a “normal” level, (B) and a high level (B +∆ B), based on another set of
conditional probabilities: ΠB.
In the model government interventions will only occur following negative economic shocks, so
the transition dynamics for the bond supply is a Markov Chain where the transition probabilities
9The proportional taxation on bond income is redundant since bonds are issued by the government. Nevertheless,
since this taxation does exist in reality, we include it in the model to make the calibration more transparent.
10It would also be interesting to study the possibility of ﬁnancing the government expenditures with distortionary
labor income taxes, however this would require the inclusion of a labor supply decision, a substantial additional
complexity. In addition, as we discuss below, models with labor taxes and endogenous labor supply face an important
calibration problem, unless diﬀerent complex features of the tax code are carefully modeled, making this an even
more formidable computational task. Therefore, in this paper, we only consider alternative combinations of capital
income taxes and debt as sources of ﬁnancing government interventions.
11The government is assumed to re-invest to oﬀ-set depreciation, thus keeping the value of its capital stock constant
over time.8
also depend on the realization of the stochastic depreciation shock, ΠB =Π B(Bt+1,B t,ηt), and in
particular:
π








HLL/2 eﬀectively determines the unconditional probability of an intervention occurring.
In addition, we will also assume that the expected duration of the increase in bond supply is
independent of state of the economy following the intervention date:
π
B(Bt+1 = B,Bt = B +∆ B,η t =1 )=π
B
LHL = π
B(Bt+1 = B,Bt = B +∆ B,η t = −1) = π
B
LHH > 0
It would be trivial to change this set-up, and consider diﬀerent probabilities here, but that would
add one more parameter to calibrate.
With regards to the capital income tax rate, the transition probabilities in the Markov Chain
depend on the bond supply (Πτ =Π τ(τK,t+1,τK,t,B t+1)), since tax rates only increase in the years
following a bond issuance (to ﬁnance the additional interest payments)
π




τ(τK,t+1 = τK +∆ τ,τK,t = τK,B t = B)=π
τ
HLL =0
and revert back to normal when government debt reverts back to B:
π




τ(τK,t+1 = τK,τK,t = τK +∆ τ,B t = B)=π
τ
LHL =1
To summarize, across the two Markov Chains we only have two transition probabilities to cali-
brate:
1) The unconditional probability of an intervention: πB
HLL/2
2) The expected duration of the intervention (higher bonds and taxes): πB
LHL(= πB
LHH)
2.2.3 Foreign-held government bonds
In the data, not all of government debt is owned by national residents. In the US, between 1970 and
2003, on average 20% of debt held by the public is held by foreign investors. While this number was
relatively stable throughout 1990’s, in the last 15 years there has been a substantial upward trend
and this percentage more than doubled. This motivates our baseline calibration of B to the actual9
percentage of bonds held by US households. However, when we increase the supply of bonds we
now need to make an assumption regarding the percentage of these new bonds that will be bought
by foreigners. In the US in particular, there is currently signiﬁcant concern that this percentage will
be much lower than in the past. Therefore, while in our baseline calibration we set this percentage
(later on denoted by bF) equal to 25%, we will also consider a scenario where this number is lower.
2.3 Households and ﬁnancial markets
Households have Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein-Zin (1991)) deﬁned over a single nondurable















where ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ψ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution and β is the discount factor. Household have a ﬁnite horizon divided in two main periods:
working life and retirement.
We let i index individual households, and a denote age/cohort. The stochastic process for
individual labor income (Hi





a ,( 8 )
where Li
a (the household’s labor productivity) is a function of age. This productivity is speciﬁed
to match the standard stochastic earnings proﬁle in life-cycle models. More precisely, labor income
productivity combines both permanent (P i













where f(a) is a deterministic function of age, capturing the typical hump-shape proﬁle in life-cycle
earnings. We assume that lnεi, and lnξ
i are each independent and identically distributed with
mean {−.5 ∗ σ2
ε , −.5 ∗ σ2
ξ}, and variances σ2
ε and σ2
ξ, respectively.
Retirement is exogenous and deterministic. All households retire at age 65 (aR = 46) and
retirement earnings are given by: λP i
aRWt,w h e r eλ is the (exogenous) replacement ratio. The
retirement income is funded by a proportional social security tax τs discussed later.
Households receive labor income during working life and pension payments during retirement,
and can invest in two ﬁnancial assets: a one-period riskless asset (government bond), and a risky10
investment opportunity (capital stock). The riskless asset return is RB
t = 1
P B
t−1 − 1, where P B
denotes the government bond price. The return on the risky asset is denoted by RK
t . We assume
that households cannot borrow against their future labor income, and cannot short the risky asset.
In appendix A we formally state the household dynamic programming problem.
2.4 Equilibrium
Households are price takers and maximize utility given their expectations about future asset returns
and aggregate wages. Under rational expectations, the latter are given by equations (2) and (3):
returns and wages are determined by future capital and labor, and by the realizations of aggregate
shocks. Labor supply is exogenous, as are the distributions of the aggregate shocks. The capital
stock, however, is endogenous. Forming rational expectations of future returns and wages is, there-
fore, essentially equivalent to forecasting the future mean capital stock (from equation (3)). As
shown by Krusell and Smith (1998), for this class of incomplete market economies, it is possible
to forecast the one-period ahead aggregate capital stock extremely accurately by using its current
value (Kt) and the state-contingent realizations of the aggregate shocks. We use this methodology
to solve for the equilibrium of the model. The deﬁnition of the equilibrium is given in appendix A
and the numerical solution method is outlined in appendix B.
3 Calibration
Households and ﬁrms make decisions on an annual frequency. The household earnings processes
and social security are calibrated from evidence based on micro-economic data (PSID), while the
other parameters are used to match several empirical moments. The government sector variables
are calibrated to match the ratios of government bonds, government expenditures and tax revenues
to GDP. The technological parameters and preference parameters are chosen to try to replicate,
as close as possible, multiple diﬀerent moments such as the consumption and investment shares of
GDP, consumption volatility, wealth distribution, limited participation, and the mean and volatility
of returns.
3.1 Labor income and social security
Agents begin working life at age 20, retire at 65, and can live up to age 90. The parameters for
the household earnings processes are taken from previous studies using the PSID. More speciﬁcally,
the variances of the idiosyncratic shocks are taken from Carroll (1992): 10 percent per year for11
σε and 8 percent per year for σξ, while the parameter values for the deterministic labor income
proﬁle, reﬂecting the hump shape of earnings over the life-cycle, are taken from Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (2005).
For tractability we assume that the social security budget is balanced in all periods. Given
a value for the replacement ratio of working life earnings (λ), the social security tax rate (τs)
is determined endogenously. This tax rate ensures that social security taxes are equal to total
retirement beneﬁts, taking into account the demographic weights. Consistent with the empirical
evidence with regards to median replacement rates from the U.S. social security system, we use
a 40% replacement rate (as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)), which implies an endogenous social
security tax (τs) of approximately 17.5% to maintain social security balance period by period.
3.2 Technology
Capital’s share of output (α) is set to 34%, and the average annual depreciation rate (δ)i s8 %t o
match the investment to output ratio. To match asset return volatility we set the standard deviation
of the stochastic depreciation shock at 13%. The aggregate productivity shock follows a two-state
Markov Chain and its unconditional standard deviation (2.5%) is chosen to match the standard
deviation in aggregate output (taken from the NIPA tables, published by the BEA). The transition
probability of changing states is calibrated to 0.4, to match the average duration of business cycles,
and deterministic growth is set at 1% (G =1 .01)
3.3 Government sector
3.3.1 “Normal-period” parameters
The aggregate supply of bonds is set to 35% of GDP, which is the average value of U.S. Treasury
securities held by the U.S. public, reported by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (from 1962 to 2003).
We only include the debt held by U.S. households because in the model this number will also
correspond to domestically-held debt. This ignores the interest payments on foreign-held bonds
in the government’s budget constraint. However, we can simply interpret these as an additional
exogenous source of government expenditures (G). Using the average historical values for both the
cost of debt and total debt outstanding, this corresponds to an additional 0.6% of GDP, which
has a fairly negligible impact on our baseline calibration of G. In our analysis, when we increase
government debt within the model, we explicitly keep track of the total supply of bonds (rather
than just the one held domestically) in the government’s budget constraint.12
We also need to match the share of government expenditures in GDP, which is an endoge-
nous quantity in the model. This is achieved through an appropriate calibration of the tax rates.
However, even ignoring this extra constraint, the calibration of each tax rate already (potentially)
requires a compromise between matching two diﬀerent features of the data: the tax rate itself or
the corresponding share of tax revenues in GDP. We compute the tax shares using data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1929 until 2006.12 For capital income taxes we set the “normal”
tax rate (τK) to 40%, following Trabandt and Uhlig (2006), Carey and Rabesona (2002) and Men-
doza, Razin and Tesar (1994). We discuss the calibration of the higher tax rate and the transition
probabilities in the next section.
With respect to the tax rate on labor income, the calibration decision is clear: since we do not
have a labor supply decision in the model, then these are eﬀectively lump-sum taxes, and therefore
we want to match the revenue share, as opposed to the tax rate. As shown in table 2, a ﬂat rate
of 10% generates tax revenues which are in line with the empirical numbers.13 Note that, our
marginal tax rate on labor income is much lower than the one faced by most households. This
result is actually very general. Quite simply, with Cobb-Douglas technology labor income as a
fraction of GDP is simply 1−α, and with a linear tax schedule the share of labor revenues in GDP
becomes τl(1 − α).14 Therefore, in this class of models, researchers can either match the marginal
tax rate and dramatically over-estimate the importance of labor tax revenues in the data, or match
the revenues themselves and signiﬁcantly under-estimate the distortion at the margin.15
This still leaves us with one parameter left to calibrate: the tax rate on consumption. As
previously discussed we want the model to match the share of government expenditures in GDP,
so this is actually not a free parameter. We set τC = 13% to match G/Y given the other tax rates
and the calibration of B/Y. It turns out that this number delivers total tax revenues, as a share of
GDP, which are fairly close to their empirical counterpart.
12The BEA data does not provide a disaggregation of total personal income taxes, and therefore we combine it
with data from the IRS to compute the relative percentages of labor income and capital income taxation included
in this category.
13As we can see from the table, the ratio of labor tax revenues to GDP has increased over time. Although in most
of our calibration we have considered long time-series as much as possible, we want the ﬁscal policy conditions in our
baseline economy to be fairly close to the current values, so that our results are directly applicable to the current US
economy. Therefore, here we put more emphasis on matching the 2006 value (8.71%) than the 1929-2006 average
(6.80%).
14In our model the numbers are actually slightly diﬀerent because we also have retired households.
15This naturally reﬂects the multiple sources of deductions and exemptions that are not being modeled with a
linear tax schedule. These issues and trade-oﬀs are discussed in more detailed in Castaneda et al. (2003).13
3.3.2 Intervention parameters
In our analysis we only consider government expenditures directly related to investments in the
corporate sector, and therefore exclude the stimulus package aimed at increasing household-level
net worth and consumption. Naturally, if we also include this set of expenditures the distortionary
cost would be higher, but this type of interventions are not so unusual in periods of recession, and
we are only interested in the potentially less orthodox measure: government capital investments
and related expenditures.
In the baseline version we set the percentage increase in bonds (∆B/B) to 25%, corresponding to
8.75% of GDP, and the increase in the capital income tax rate (∆τ) to 1.5 percentage points. This
tax rate increase is determined by trial and error so that government consumption is equal across
the two scenarios, with and without intervention. To calibrate the amount of debt increase during
the intervention we aggregate investments administered in 2008-2009 through several government
programs. In our baseline calibration we take a slightly conservative approach, since some of these
programs were ﬁnanced by the Treasury and others by the Federal reserve, and the former were
not immediately ﬁnanced by additional debt. However, we will consider alternative scenarios in our
experiments.
We include the following items in our calculations16: conservatorship of Fannie Mae ($34.2B)
and Freddie Mac ($50.7B); assets purchases from collapsed Bear Sterns ($26.4B); takeover of Amer-
ican International Group ($118.9B); capital infusion program for banks ($204.7B, part of TARP);
additional TARP funds for Citigroup and Bank of America ($40B); TARP funds ($83.5B) for
restructuring of automotive industry (GM, Chrysler) and aﬃliates (GMAC, Chrysler Financial,
autoparts suppliers). These investments amount to $558.4B or 3.9% of GDP of $14.3 trillion (as
of 4-th quarter 2007). In addition, the Federal Reserve supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by
purchasing $139.8B of GSE’s debt and through the summer of 2009 purchased $776.9B of mortgage-
backed securities issued by them. While these transactions are not supported by issuing treasury
debt, they substitute the traditional function of private capital markets. Including them brings the
total government intervention to $1,479B or about 10.3% of 2007Q4 GDP. Given that we calibrate
the debt to GDP ratio to its long run average of 35%, this expansion of debt would correspond to
the ratio rising to 45.3%. We consider a somewhat more conservative calibration and assume that
outstanding debt is increased by 8.75% of GDP (25% of its current value) bringing the total debt
16These numbers are available from the US Treasury, Board of Governors and the New
York Federal Reserve. An updated recent summary is provided on the web by CNN Money:
http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/index.html., and as previously mentioned,
we exclude all items related to stimulus package for consumption.14
during the intervention to 43.7% of GDP. An alternative way to assess this number is to consider
that public debt has grown from 35.7% GDP in 2007Q4 to 50.2% in 2009Q2, a change of 14.5 per-
centage points.17 As previously mentioned, we calibrate the increase in debt by 8.75% of GDP, thus
attributing about 60% of the actually observed increase in debt to direct government intervention
in capital markets, which we view as a slightly conservative estimate.
As previously discussed, a substantial portion of the US national debt (about 20% in the 1990’s
and over 40% in recent years) is held by non-residents and there is a concern that this percentage
will be much lower in the future, as foreigners will be unwilling to buy as many bonds as they
have done in the past. This could result from foreign governments redirecting ﬁnancial resources
to stabilize their own economies or it could be due to the beneﬁts from diversifying into non-dollar
denominated bonds. Therefore, while in our baseline calibration we assume that 25% of the new
bonds will be bought outside of the US (bF = 25%) , we will also consider a scenario where this
number is signiﬁcantly lower (bF = 10%).
Finally we still have to calibrate the transition probabilities for bonds and taxes (ΠB and Πτ).
When describing the model we discussed a set of assumptions that impose tight restrictions on
most of these parameters. Namely, we assumed that: i) an intervention only occurs following a
negative economic state; ii) capital income taxes increase in the year following the intervention to
ﬁnance the additional interest payments; iii) tax shocks revert back to their normal level once the
same has happened to the bonds; and iv) the expected duration of the increase in bond supply is
independent of state of the economy following the intervention date. In section 2.2, we explained
how these assumptions imply several zero/one or equality restrictions on diﬀerent parameters of the
transition matrices ΠB and Πτ, leaving only two free parameters to calibrate. These are:
1) the unconditional probability of an intervention (πB
HLL/2): we set this equal to 0.01 in the
baseline case, implying a 1 in 100 years probability of an intervention. In the US we could argue
that we had one or two such scenarios (now and maybe following the Great Depression), in a period
of just over 100 years, but clearly those are too few observations to infer an expected probability.
However, this variable does not play a signiﬁcant role in any of our results, as long as we keep this
value relatively small, which is perfectly reasonable.
2) the expected duration of the intervention, with both higher bonds and taxes (1/πB
LHL(=
1/πB
LHH)): in the baseline case we set this equal to 5 years, but we will also consider longer lasting
interventions.
17As reported by the US Department of the Treasury (series FYGFDPUN available from the St. Louis Fed data
wesite), debt held by the public at in 2007Q4 was $5.13T and rose by about $2 trillion to $7.17T by 2009Q2.15
3.4 Preference heterogeneity and limited participation
We consider two groups (A and B) of households in the model: stock market participants and
non-participants. In the recent data, the two groups are almost identical in size (55% and 45%
respectively, using the data from the 2001 SCF).18 However, they have very diﬀerent wealth ac-
cumulation proﬁles: the participation rate is 88.84% among households with wealth above the
median, and only 15.21% for those with wealth below the median. In the model we treat limited
participation as exogenous for tractability reasons, but make sure that the wealth accumulation
diﬀerences are consistent with the data.19 We use ex-ante preference heterogeneity in the discount
factor and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to endogenously generate diﬀerent wealth
accumulation proﬁles, and we assume stockholders make up 50% of the population, consistent with
the empirical magnitudes in the U.S. economy. Type-A (non-stockholders) have a very low discount
factor (β =0 .7) and never accumulate much wealth over the life cycle, while type-B (stockholders)
have a higher discount factor (β =0 .99) chosen to match the historical risk free rate.20 There
is strong evidence that stockholders have a higher EIS than non-stockholders (see, for example,
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). Therefore, we assume that non-stockholders have a lower EIS in the
model as well. We pick ψ
A =0 .45 to match the wealth accumulation of this group, in combination
with the discount factor. The value of the EIS stockholders is chosen to match, as close as possible,
two diﬀerent moments: the volatility of consumption growth for this group, and the volatility of
the riskless rate. This gives us ψ
B =0 .7 and, as we will see later, a good calibration of both of
these moments. Finally, both types have the same risk aversion coeﬃcient (ρ =5 ) .
18These numbers take into account households that participate in the stock market indirectly through pension
funds.
19Given the low wealth accumulation of non-stockholders, a small one-time entry cost would suﬃce to endogeneize
the non-participation decision. For example, Alan (2006) estimates a structural participation model and ﬁnds
that a one-time entry cost equal to approximately 2-3% of average annual income explains limited stock market
participation. Gomes and Michaelides (2008) show that a one-time cost of 5% of average annual income would deter
participation for the poorer households while matching the conditional wealth accumulation of both stockholders
and non-stockholders. We leave such an entry cost out of the model to reduce the computational burden.
20We emphasize that the quantitative results are almost identical regardless of the method we use to generate
“poor” non-stockholders. What really matters is that we replicate poor households within the model. The same
quantitative results would be obtained under alternative speciﬁcations, as long as these two groups are calibrated
to match the same heterogeneity in wealth accumulation. For example, Gomes and Michaelides (2008) consider
heterogeneity in risk aversion and EIS, with β =0 .99 for both groups, among other combinations.16
4 Unconditional baseline results
4.1 Macroeconomic variables and asset prices
Table 1 reports the main macroeconomic quantities. The shares of consumption, investment and
government expenditures and debt relative to GDP match their empirical counterparts quite ac-
curately (panel A). The empirical moments are taken from the National Accounts reported by
Bureau of Economic Analysis, from 1929 until 2007. Following Castaneda et al. (2003) we classify
75% of durable consumption expenditures as investment and 25% as consumption. Panel B shows
that the volatilities of aggregate consumption and output growth in the model (3.02% and 3.92%,
respectively) match extremely well with the ones in the data (3.28% and 4.28%, respectively).
Panel B also shows that consumption growth of stockholders is more volatile than the consump-
tion growth of non-stockholders, consistent with the empirical evidence in Malloy, Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
Table 2 compares the diﬀerent tax revenues as a percentage of GDP relative to the 2006 data
and relative to the average tax revenues over the 1929-2006 period. The tax revenues from capital
income taxation are 5.45 percent of GDP relative to 5.78 percent in the 2006 data and 5.26 percent
in the longer run average (1929-2006). Labor income and consumption tax revenues are also similar
in magnitude to the data, providing some comfort that the tax base is captured at some level by
the model.21
Table 3 reports the main asset pricing moments implied by the model, along with their empirical
U.S. counterparts. The returns series are taken from CRSP. The equity return is the real return
on the CRSP value-weighted index (including dividends), and the rate of return on government
bonds is the real return on 1-year government bonds.22 Since ﬁrms in the model are not levered,
our return on capital corresponds to the return of unlevered equity in the data. Therefore, we
adjust the moments of our return series by the average leverage of US corporations to make them
comparable with the CRSP data.23 The equity premium in the model is relatively close to its
empirical counterpart (5.23% versus 6.54%), and the same applies to the risk free rate (1.81%
21The model does not feature progressive taxation. We view this as an interesting extension of independent interest
in the face of large changes in government debt that need to be ﬁnanced by large increases in the highest marginal
tax rate.
22We consider 1-year bonds because we have a yearly model and, in the model, government bonds are risk free
over 1 period. In the data, the average maturity for government debt has changed over time, but it is close to 5
years. The rates of return on this debt however, also include a potentially non-trivial risk premium. Nevertheless, if
we use the price series for 5-year government bonds, we would actually obtain a very similar average return (1.66%
versus 1.23%), and the main diﬀerence would be the standard deviation: 6.10% versus 3.83%.
23Since we are implicitly assuming risk-free corporate debt, expected levered returns are computed using the simple17
versus 1.23%). Likewise the return standard deviations (respectively, 19.74% and 1.21% for equity
and bonds) are also very similar to those observed in the data.24
4.2 Cross-sectional inequality and life-cycle proﬁles
The combination of idiosyncratic shocks, preference heterogeneity and diﬀerences in stock market
participation status induces signiﬁcant cross-sectional heterogeneity in wealth accumulation and
consumption. The model generates gini coeﬃcients for wealth and consumption of 0.7a n d0 .29,
respectively, which compare very well with 0.8a n d0 .25 in the data.25 Table 4 reports the shares
of wealth held by diﬀerent percentiles of the wealth distribution both in the model and in the 2001
SCF.26 Overall, the model captures relatively well the wealth distribution. In particular, it replicates
the fact that wealth below the median is negligible, while households in the top quintile hold 69%
of total assets in our economy versus 83% in the data. For stockholders, the wealth distribution
is not as skewed as in the data, since our economy does not capture the rich entrepreneurs that
dominate the top end of the distribution.27
Figure 1 plots life cycle gini coeﬃcients of consumption. Consistent with the empirical evi-
dence in Deaton and Paxson (1994), and more recently in Krueger and Perri (2006), consumption
inequality increases with age, and is much more pronounced during retirement because a signiﬁ-
cant fraction of the population (mostly non-stockholders) saves very little wealth during working











Along the same lines, the Sharpe ratio on levered equity must be identical to the Sharpe ratio on unlevered equity,










24The target risk-free rate volatility is about 2% rather than the historical realized volatility, since we do not have
inﬂation in the model.
25The wealth gini coeﬃcient is computed from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, while the consumption gini
coeﬃcient is taken from Krueger and Perri (2006).
26In the SCF, wealth is deﬁned as liquid assets net of all non-real estate loans plus real estate equity. Liquid wealth
is made up of all types of transaction accounts, certiﬁcates of deposit, total directly-held mutual funds, stocks, bonds,
total quasi-liquid ﬁnancial assets, savings bonds, the cash value of whole life insurance, other managed assets (trusts,
annuities and managed investment accounts) and other ﬁnancial assets. Home equity is deﬁned as the value of the
home less the amount still owed on the ﬁrst and 2nd/3rd mortgages and the amount owed on home equity lines of
credit. Debts include all uncollateralized loans (credit cards, consumer installment loans) and loans against pensions.
27In the data, stockholders are deﬁned as households owning stocks directly or through mutual funds either in
taxable accounts or in pension plans.18
non-stockholders wealth inequality is mostly driven by the inequality in labor income, with a strong
fanning out over the life cycle. After age 65 there is a signiﬁcant decrease as they quickly run down
their limited savings. Stockholders, on the other hand, save aggressively from early on, leading to a
slight reduction in the gini coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst few years of working life. Wealth inequality then
rises from age 25 onwards as they accumulate substantial amounts of wealth. As a whole, there is
substantial wealth dispersion in the economy reﬂecting the diﬀerential savings behavior across the
two diﬀerent groups.
5 Response to government intervention: baseline scenario
Given the reasonable empirical implications of the quantitative model, we can now use the model
to assess its implications both for aggregate and cross-sectional outcomes. We consider a scenario
similar to the sequence of events in 2007-09, where two years of bad economic shocks depleted
the aggregate capital stock. In the model, the negative stochastic depreciation shocks capture this
event. A ﬁscal intervention takes place in the following year, when a third consecutive negative
realization of the economic shock occurs. Results under alternative “recession” scenarios are almost
identical and are available upon request.28
5.1 Aggregate Results
5.1.1 Impulse Responses
The impulse responses are shown in ﬁgure 3. The ﬁgure plots the diﬀerence between the outcomes
of otherwise identical simulated economies with and without a ﬁscal expansion. In the year of the
ﬁscal expansion the government issues bonds, and in order to be able to absorb them households cut
down on private investment quite dramatically: aggregate private investment falls by 31.3%. The
net eﬀect on investment is still positive, due to the large increase in public investment, and therefore
the capital stock increases.29 This leads to higher aggregate wages, while the cost of capital falls
by 15 basis points. This reduction in the cost of capital softens the pressure on the riskless rate
resulting from the large increase in bond supply. Nevertheless, the net result is still positive with
the riskless rate increasing by 6 basis points (approximately 3% of the unconditional average)30.
28Naturally the actual individual responses will depend on the recession scenariobeing considered, but the diﬀerence
between the responses with and without ﬁscal intervention is very similar in all cases considered.
29The capital stock increases relative to the no-intervention case, which is what is being plotted in the ﬁgure, but
not in absolute terms.
30These results are consistent with Laubach’s (2008) empirical estimates.19
With higher wages consumption increases, although mostly for non-stockholders, as stockholders
also have to pay higher capital income taxes: the tax rate must increase to pay for the interest
on the new public debt. Aggregate consumption also responds positively in the ﬁrst period of
ﬁscal intervention, being the weighted average of the stockholder and non-stockholder consumption
increases.
Over the next few years, with private investment being crowded-out through the distortionary
higher capital tax rates, the capital stock starts falling and this leads to a mirror-image reduction
in wages and non-stockholder consumption. The drop in the capital stock is associated with an
increase in the cost of capital. Stockholder consumption now falls below zero as the aggregate
capital drops, capital gains taxes have risen and wages have also fallen.
Once the ﬁscal expansion is concluded, the capital stock drops by almost 0.5% due to insuf-
ﬁcient private investment. Equity returns increase signiﬁcantly at this point, while wages drop.
Consumption falls by about 0.2% for non-stockholders (which are almost exclusively dependent
on wage income) and by approximately 0.3% for stockholders. With a high cost of capital in the
economy private investment is sluggish to adjust, and as a result the recovery period takes several
years. These results might seem to suggest that the best policy would be to continue with the high
debt level and never revert back to the previous steady-state, but this is actually not the case. As
we will show below (subsection 6.1), such a scenario would actually deliver worse outcomes for all
the variables of interest that we have computed.
The initial increase in interest rates might seem counterfactual, since we actually observed a
signiﬁcant decrease in interest rates during this period. It is important to remember that these are
diﬀerences in responses across two scenarios. Actual short-term interest rates were kept low in 2008
and 2009 because the Fed decreased its target rate, among other measures. The ﬁgures simply point
out that there was an upward pressure on interest rates from the real side of the economy, which
is higher in the presence of government intervention. As a result, we can conclude that the Fed’s
eﬀorts to kept short-term interest rates low had to be more signiﬁcant because of the ﬁscal bailout.
Indeed, as the crisis progressed, the Fed implemented several additional measures to maintain low
interest rates, such as a wider range of collateral securities accepted for loans, intervention in the
short-term commercial paper markets, purchases of mortgage-backed debt and direct purchases of
treasury securities.
The non-linear response of the government bond interest rate is instructive of the economic
mechanism behind the ’bailout’. In the ﬁrst period when the government issues a large number of
new bonds the interest rate has to increase to induce households to buy them. The proceeds are
invested in the capital stock which becomes productive next period. This then implies a decrease20
in the equity return and consequently also the risk-free rate as (an imperfect) substitute for capital.
The following periods we start to register the crowding out of the capital stock which gradually
raises the return on equity, and therefore the return on the government bonds as well. When the
ﬁscal expansion ends, the government-owned part of the capital stock reverts to zero causing a
drop in the aggregate capital stock next period and a current decrease in the amount of bonds
outstanding (to the pre-intervention level). A drop in the current amount of bonds generates a
decrease in the current risk free rate while the subsequent increase in the equity return generates
an increase in next-period’s risk free rate to clear markets. From then on, the equity and risk free
rate move in the same direction as the aggregate capital stock reverts to its pre-intervention steady
state.
5.1.2 Average responses
As previously discussed, since we have an incomplete markets economy, we do not have a well-deﬁned
social welfare function that will allow us to quantify the impact of these decisions on individual
welfare. Moreover, we are interested in how observable variables are aﬀected by policy actions.
Therefore, as a guidance, we report the impact on important aggregate measures such as GDP,
capital stock, aggregate consumption, and the total consumption of both stockholders and non-
stockholders. In our baseline calculation we do not discount future period outcomes, for the simple
reason that this is an overlapping generations economy and therefore we should treat all generations
identically.31,32 The results are shown in Table 5.
In the short-term the ﬁscal expansion induces additional investment in capital thus increasing
aggregate output. Cohorts living in the economy during the ﬁrst ten years following the govern-
ment intervention will observe GDP to be higher by an average of 0.04% each year. However, for
the average consumer, this extra investment is not desirable with aggregate consumption below its
steady-state level by an average of 0.06% each year. This is particularly the case for stockholders,
who suﬀer from the lower return on capital and the higher taxes, and for whom average consump-
tion falls by 0.14%. The average non-stockholder actually beneﬁts in the short-run, with average
consumption for this group actually increasing because of the higher aggregate wages. However,
as we consider the welfare of future generations, the results become negative for all groups and all
variables. Just by expanding the analysis to consider the generations present in the economy over
the next 20 years we now ﬁnd lower average output (-0.02%), and lower average consumption for
31Growth is already “taken out” because we report diﬀerences in outcomes across two alternative scenarios.
32For completeness, later on we will also report results obtained when we discount future outcomes/generations,
and the diﬀerences are negligible in most cases.21
both groups: -0.02% for non-stockholders and -0.15% for stockholders. If we go even further, and
consider all cohorts in the economy over the next 50 years, (roughly the period until the impulse re-
sponses “die out”), we ﬁnd non-trivial overall losses: 0.06% of consumption per year, corresponding
to -2.75% of annual consumption in present-value, which converts into approximately $300 Billion.
These results also identify a redistributive eﬀect, with stockholders signiﬁcantly more aﬀected
than non-stockholders. Even though this was expected given the increase in capital income taxes,
this is only part of the story. The tax rate is only higher during the ﬁscal expansion period (the ﬁrst
ﬁve years), but stockholders’ ﬁnancial income (private capital stock times the return on capital)
remains low for much longer, and in particular it falls by more than wage income. This is driven
by the direct crowding-out eﬀect and therefore it is unrelated to our assumptions about the form
of taxation used to ﬁnance the interest on the bonds.33
5.1.3 Average responses with discounting
In Table 6 we now report the results for diﬀerent discount rates for future outcomes. We consider
three cases for the discount rate: 0 (our baseline, and preferred choice), 2% (slightly higher than
our riskless rate, but close to the risk premium on an unlevered aggregate consumption claim in this
economy), and rK (which we view as an absolute upper bound on a sensible discount rate, since all
of these variables have weakly lower risk).
As we consider a higher discount rate the average decreases in aggregate consumption are only
slightly reduced. In fact, with a 2% discount rate the numbers are almost identical. For those
variables that take positive values early on (aggregate output, aggregate capital and consumption
of non-stockholders), the responses are now actually higher, because the positive values occur exactly
in the very ﬁrst years, and only later on do they become negative. Nevertheless, with a 2% discount
rate the numbers are very close to the baseline values, and even with the extreme discount rate (rK)
the diﬀerences are quite small. The only exception occurs for the 10-year response of the capital
stock, because of a sharp change from early large positive numbers to very large negative ones.
5.2 Cross-Sectional Implications
As brieﬂy discussed above, stockholders and non-stockholders, for example, are diﬀerently aﬀected
by the ﬁscal expansion. Now we study in more detail the diﬀerential impact of this intervention on
various groups of households.
33In practice, even if the interest on the bonds is ﬁnanced (partially) by labor income taxation, the direct eﬀect is
still likely to aﬀect shareholders mostly, as in most countries labor taxation is progressive.22
5.2.1 Diﬀerential Impact by Wealth Levels
In Table 7 we report the average changes in consumption for diﬀerent quartiles of the wealth
distribution, at horizons of both 20 and 50 years. Below each of these we also report the percentage
of total consumption change that is coming from the response in each individual quartile. This
number is computed by equally weighting the percentage changes in each household’s individual
response, thus giving the same weight to all agents in the economy.34 We ﬁnd that the cost is
borne disproportionately by the richer households: almost two thirds of the drop in consumption
occurs within the top 25% of the wealth distribution. The other quartiles register very similar
responses, despite the fact that the vast majority of households in the second highest quartile are
also stockholders (which represent half of the total population). Therefore, we can conclude that
the middle class (quartiles 2 and 3) is aﬀected very similarly, regardless of whether they invest in
equities or not, and the diﬀerences between the rich and the rest of the population seem to be more
important than the heterogeneity between stockholders and non-stockholders.
5.2.2 Diﬀerential Impact by Age
Next we consider the impact on diﬀerent age groups. How are households at diﬀerent stages of their
life-cycle being aﬀected? In Table 8 we report the average changes in consumption for diﬀerent age
groups, at horizons of both 20 and 50 years.35
The results show that the costs fall more signiﬁcantly on retirees, who face 50% of the total
decrease in consumption. In fact there is a clear monotonic pattern, with the cost increasing with
age. Intuitively, as shown in ﬁgure 3, most of the capital crowding-out occurs within the ﬁrst 25
years. It is therefore mostly during this period that all households in the economy are negatively
aﬀected by the distortionary impact of the ﬁscal intervention. Young households, who still expect
to live another 30 to 40 years after this period, do not need to decrease their current consumption
as much, because they know they will be better oﬀ later on. At the other extreme, for retirees,
this is most of their remaining lives, and they are unlikely to be alive by the time the economy has
returned to its steady-state. As a result, their consumption must drop much more signiﬁcantly.
This analysis is slightly misleading since we are not actually tracking a given cohort, which is
what we report next. We start by reporting these numbers because they are directly comparable
with the ones in our previous tables. However, when we compare actual cohorts we cannot compare
34Otherwise, we would mechanically conclude that consumption of richer households explains a disproportionate
fraction of aggregate consumption.
35We don’t include households aged more than 80 because these have very little wealth and essentially set their
consumption equal to their social security income. The results are almost identical if we add them to the last group.23
the consumption change across all 50 years of the simulation (when we are essentially back at the
steady-state levels) because some of those cohorts will not be alive anymore. In Table 8, panel B,
we report the results for 4 speciﬁc cohorts: the cohorts of households aged 30, 45, 60 and 75 at
the time of the ﬁscal intervention. We report the consumption changes over the following 15 years,
during which all of these are still alive, thus making the comparison meaningful. The results are
very similar to the ones reported in table 8, panel A, thus conﬁrming the previous conclusions.
6 Response to government intervention: alternative sce-
narios
6.1 Duration of ﬁscal intervention period
One important determinant of the magnitude of the distortionary cost is the length of the time
period during which government debt and taxes will diﬀer from their “steady-state” values. Never-
theless, in a rare event like the current situation, we do not know for how long this will be the case
in reality. We therefore consider alternative scenarios in our analysis. Along these lines, we now
assume a longer lasting ﬁscal expansion. More precisely we set (both the expected and the actual)
duration of the expansion (1/πB
LHL =1 /πB
LHH) equal to 10 years. The average results are shown in
Table 9, while Figure 4 plots some of the impulse responses.36
During the ﬁrst ten years we now have a much stronger increase in the capital stock and con-
sequently aggregate output, but nevertheless consumption is still falling, even though the ﬁscal
expansion is in progress during all this period. Figure 4 plots the impulse response of aggregate
consumption and we can see that it becomes negative already in year 5, long before the ﬁscal
expansion is concluded. Moreover, we also see that both aggregate output and aggregate capital
are almost exactly back to their initial levels by year 10. Thus, even before the intervention is
concluded, not only is consumption already signiﬁcantly lower, but in addition the ﬁscal expansion
is only generating a marginal increase in output. This conﬁrms that a longer-lasting intervention
is not a solution for keeping the economy on a positive growth path with high consumption. On
the contrary, as the expansion continues, it becomes more and more ineﬀective, since households
eventually re-adjust their own savings and allocations. In addition, the average longer-term impact
on all variables is signiﬁcantly more negative than in the baseline case, with a total present-value
consumption loss of 6.26% of annual consumption (approximately $600 Billion).
36All others are available upon request.24
6.2 Foreign demand for additional government debt
Another important determinant of the ﬁscal impact of the ‘bailout’ will be the government’s ability
to sell additional debt to foreign investors. If those investors are not simply willing to increase their
holdings of US bonds in the same proportion, then a larger fraction will have to be absorbed by US
households, implying a higher increase in the interest rate. Motivated by this we now consider an
alternative scenario regarding the foreign demand for the new government bonds. More precisely,
we assume that only 10% of the new bonds will be taken up by foreign entities, as opposed to the
25% value in the baseline calculations.
In this scenario, in the ﬁrst year, the risk-free rate increases by 7.8 basis points while private
investment falls by 38%, compared with 5.8 basis points and 31% respectively, in the baseline case.
Over the ﬁve years of the ﬁscal expansion the risk-free rate is now 6.9 basis points higher, on average,
as opposed to 2.3 basis points higher in the original experiment. As a result, short term growth is
more short-lived and the average changes in output and capital are already negative in the ﬁrst 10
years, as shown in Table 10. The long term eﬀects are very similar because, once the debt reverts
back to its steady-state level, the diﬀerence in foreign holdings also disappears.
6.3 Magnitude of ﬁscal intervention
As previously discussed, our baseline calibration takes a slightly conservative estimate of total level
of government investment-related expenditures, since some of these were actually implemented by
the Federal Reserve, and therefore did not immediately imply new debt issues. However, we now
consider a alternative scenario, a ﬁscal expansion that will match more closely the total amount
actually spent, regardless of the institution.37 Therefore, we now assume that government debt
increases by 35%, instead of 25% as in the baseline case. The results are shown in Table 11.
Naturally the short-term expansions both in GDP and in the capital stock are more signiﬁcant,
but even in the ﬁrst 10 years the consumption response is virtually identical despite the large ﬁscal
policy boost. As we consider subsequent periods there is now a stronger decline in consumption,
particularly for stockholders. These results help to further quantify the trade-oﬀ between short-term
expansion and medium to long-term costs.
37Nevertheless, as before, we are still excluding expenditures related to consumption stimulus packages.25
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have used an incomplete markets, heterogenous agent model that generates empirically plausible
aggregate and cross sectional implications to quantify the eﬀects of large ﬁscal interventions during
a pronounced downturn in the economy. We have found that the required increase in government
debt and taxes required to fund the government investments in capital stock, can have a large
welfare cost (300 billion US dollars). Moreover, the cost falls dramatically on those households near
the end of their working lives and on retirees. Thus, ﬁscal interventions of this magnitude can have
substantial distortionary and distributional implications, and our work provides some guidance in
evaluating quantitatively this equity-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ.
Appendix A Household Problem and Equilibrium deﬁni-
tions
A.1 Wealth accumulation
There are two ﬁnancial assets: a one-period riskless asset (government bond), and a risky investment




− 1, where P B denotes the
government bond price. The return on the risky asset is denoted by RK
t . Total liquid wealth (cash-
on-hand, Xi
t) can be consumed or invested in the two assets. At each age (a), households enter the
period with wealth invested in the bond market, Bi
at, and (potentially) in stocks, Ki
at, and receive
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Households cannot borrow against their future labor income (Bi
at ≥ 0), and cannot short the risky
asset (Ki
at ≥ 0).
In the presence of deterministic growth we need to normalize the non-stationary variables in this





















































where ωa =e x p ( f(a))ξ
i. After retirement, the equation looks the same except for the retirement















+ wtλ(1 − τL − τs)
1
ωt
A.2 The dynamic programming problem
Households are price takers and maximize utility given their expectations about future asset returns
and aggregate wages. Under rational expectations, the latter are given by equations (2) and (3):
returns and wages are determined by future capital and labor, and by the realizations of aggregate
shocks. Labor supply is exogenous, as are the distributions of the aggregate shocks. The capital
stock, however, is endogenous. Forming rational expectations of future returns and wages is, there-
fore, essentially equivalent to forecasting the future mean capital stock. As shown by Krusell and
Smith (1998), for this class of incomplete-markets economies, it is possible to forecast the one-period
ahead capital stock extremely accurately by using its current value (kt) and the state-contingent
realizations of the aggregate shocks, in our case the productivity shock (Ut ), the stochastic depre-
ciation (ηt), the capital income tax rate (τK,t), and the supply of government bonds (Bt) leading
to the following forecasting rule
kt+1 =Γ K(kt,U t,η t,τK,t,B t)( A . 3 )
Since government bonds are only riskless over one period, households must also forecast future bond
prices (P B






t ,k t,U t,η t,τK,t,B t)( A . 4 )
This process introduces six additional state variables in the individual’s maximization problem (P B
t ,
kt, Ut, ηt, τK,t,a n dBt).
The individual optimization problem then becomes:
Vt(x
i
t;kt,U t,η t,τK,t,B t,P
B
















s;ks,U s,η s,τK,s,B s,P
B
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with s = t + 1, and subject to the constraints ki
t+1 ≥ 0, bi
t+1 ≥ 0, (A.2), and the aggregate laws of
motion and expectations.27
A.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of endogenously determined prices (bond prices, wages, and equity returns),
a set of cohort-speciﬁc value functions and policy functions, ({Va,b a,k a}), and rational expectations
about the evolution of the endogenously determined variables, such that:
1. Firms maximize proﬁts by equating marginal products of capital and labor to their respective
marginal costs: equations (2) and (3).
2. Individuals choose their consumption and asset allocation by solving Equation (A.5).
3. Markets clear and aggregate quantities result from individual decisions (ki
at and bi
at), govern-
ment’s capital holdings (kG























atdadi.( A . 6 )
4. Aggregate labor supply is normalized to one.
5. Once (3) and (4) are satisﬁed, Walras’ law implies that total expenditure (government
consumption, investment, and household consumption) must equal total output:
c
G



















.( A . 7 )















aR]dadi ,( A . 8 )
where the left-hand side is integrated over all workers (a ∈ IW), while the right-hand side is
integrated over retirees (a ∈ IR). This equation determines τs for a given value of λ.
7. The government budget [equation (6)] is balanced every period to sustain a given ratio of

























t+1 − (1 − δt)kG
t )
ωt
and the law of motion for government-owned capital stock is
k
G





8. Market prices expectations are veriﬁed in equilibrium.
Analytical solutions to this problem do not exist and we therefore use a numerical solution
method. The details are given in Appendix B.
38We calibrate the baseline value of government bonds to math the holdings of US residents alone, and therefore,
in this market clearing condition, we must include only the increase in foreign bond holdings.28
Appendix B Numerical solution of the OLG model
B.1 Solution method outline
The solution method builds on Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998), Storesletten et al. (2007) and
Gomes and Michaelides (2008). We start by presenting the outer loop of the code and discuss the
details afterwards.
The numerical sequence works as follows:
i. Specify a set of forecasting equations (ΓK and ΓP).
ii. Solve the household’s decision problem, taking prices as given, and using the forecasting
equations to form expectations (details in B.2).
iii. Given the policy functions, simulate the model (5100 periods) while computing the market
clearing variables at each period (details in B.3).
iv. Use the last 5000 periods to update the coeﬃcients in the forecasting equations (details in
B.4).
v. Repeat steps 1, 2, 3, 4, with the new forecasting equations until convergence. We have two
convergence criteria:
- Stable coeﬃcients in the forecasting equations.
- Forecasting equations with regression R2 above 99.9%.
B.2 Solving the household’s decision problem
B.2.1 Discretization of the state space
Age (a) is a discrete state variable taking 71 possible values. We discretize the cash-on-hand dimen-
sion (xi
t) using 51 points, with denser grids closer to zero to take into account the higher curvature
of the value function in this region. The discrete aggregate state variables (the depreciation shock
(ηt) and the aggregate productivity shock (Ut)) each take only two possible values. With respect
to the other two continuous aggregate state variables, we use an adaptable grid that takes into
account the availability of capital in the economy and allows higher accuracy with a fewer number
of grid points. We use 15 points to discretize kt, and 15 points to discretize P B
t . The grid range
for the continuous state variables is veriﬁed ex-post by comparing with the values obtained in the
simulations, and with the results obtained when this range is increased. A smaller number of grid29
points for kt and for P B
t would not aﬀect the policy functions directly. It would, however, aﬀect the
R-squared of the forecasting equations and the convergence of their respective coeﬃcients.
B.2.2 Maximization
We solve the maximization problem for each agent type using backward induction. For every age
a prior to A, and for each point in the state space, we optimize using grid search. We need to
compute the value associated with each set of controls (consumption and share of wealth invested
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these values are given as a weighted sum of current utility ((ci
at)1−1/ψ) and the expected continuation
value (EaVa+1(.)), which we can compute once we have obtained Va+1. We use the forecasting
equations (ΓK and ΓP) to form expectations of the aggregate variables, and we perform all numerical
integrations using Gaussian quadrature to approximate the distributions of the innovations to the
labor income process (εi and ξ
i) and the aggregate shocks (ηt and Ut). For points which do not
lie on state space grid, we evaluate the value function using a cubic spline interpolation along the
cash-on-hand dimension, and a bi-linear interpolation along the other two continuous state variables
(kt and P B
t ). Bi-linear interpolation works well along these two dimensions because households are
price takers, and therefore these state variables are not aﬀected by the control variables.
B.3 Simulating the model and clearing markets
B.3.1 Simulation
We use the policy functions for the two agent types (A and B) to simulate the behavior of 250 agents
of each type in each of the 71 cohorts over 5100 periods. The realizations of the aggregate random
variables (stochastic depreciation ηt, aggregate productivity Ut, capital income tax rate, τK,t+1,
and bond supply, Bt) are drawn from their original two-point distributions, while the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks (εi and ξ
i) are drawn from the corresponding log-normal distributions. All
other random variables are endogenous to the model. The realizations of the exogenous random
variables are held constant within the outer loop, i.e. across iterations, so as not to aﬀect the
convergence criteria.30
B.3.2 Market clearing
For every time period we simulate the households’ behavior for every possible bond price (i.e.
every point in the grid for P B
t ). We then aggregate the individual bond demands and use a linear
interpolation to determine the market clearing bond price. All household equilibrium allocations
(consumption and asset holdings) are then obtained from a linear interpolation with the same
coeﬃcients, while the aggregate variables (capital and output) are computed by aggregating these
market clearing allocations. This then determines the state variables for simulating the next period’s
decisions.
B.4 Updating the forecasting equations
Using the simulated time-series (after discarding the ﬁrst 100 observations) we estimate the following
OLS regressions, for every pair of productivity shock (Ut), depreciation shock (ηt), tax rate (τK,t)
and bond supply (Bt) realizations,




t+1)=q20 + q21 ln(kt)+q22 ln(P
B
t ) (B.11)
This gives us 32 equations and 32 sets of coeﬃcients that forecast state-contingent capital (kt+1)
and bond prices (P B
t+1). We iterate the code until we have converged on the coeﬃcients and on the
R-squared of these regressions. For the ﬁrst set of equations (B.10) we obtain R-squared values
around 99.99%. For the second set of equations (B.11), the R-squared values are in the 90%−95%
range when we only use ln(kt) as a regressor, but increase to more than 99% when we add ln(P B
t ).31
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Table 1: Panel A reports values from the baseline model and aggregate U.S. data. Government debt
is the U.S. federal debt held by the public between 1952 and 2002. Panel B reports the standard
deviation of consumption (Campbell, 1999 annual data) and output (National Income and Product
Accounts data). Panel B also reports the standard deviation of stockholders’ and non-stockholders’
consumption growth rates from the baseline model and from the data (Consumer Expenditure
Survey, numbers are from Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005) and annualized).





Government Debt 35.2 35.8
Panel B: Standard deviation of growth rates (percent)
Model Data
Aggregate Output 3.9 4.3
Aggregate Consumption 3.0 3.2
Stockholders Consumption 4.4 6.9
Non-Stockholders Consumption 3.2 2.7
Table 2: Table reports tax revenue (in percent of output) by source from the baseline model and
aggregate U.S. data from the BEA National accounts.
Model Data (1929-2006) Data (2006)
Capital 5.45 5.26 5.78
Labor 8.00 6.80 8.71
Consumption 7.64 8.53 7.7735




rf Std. Dev. 1.21 3.83
Mean 7.04 7.77
rm Std. Dev. 19.74 20.11
rm − rf
Mean 5.23 6.54
Table 4: Wealth Distribution. The table reports the percentage of each group’s total wealth held
within a given percentile range. Data source: 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. Wealth is the
net worth of households as deﬁned in the text and stockholders are deﬁned as households who own
stocks directly or through mutual funds either in taxable accounts or in tax-deferred pension plans.
Non-stockholders Stockholders All
Percentile Model Data Model Data Model Data
10th 0.00 0.009 0.50 -0.021 0.00 -0.080
20th 0.00 0.009 2.50 0.41 0.00 -0.007
50th 0.39 2.42 20.73 5.60 0.12 2.90
50th-80th 6.05 18.03 36.81 16.62 30.93 14.55
80th-100th 93.56 79.55 42.46 77.78 68.96 82.54
90th-95th 9.69 14.56 10.70 11.83 17.45 12.20
95th-99th 42.59 22.26 10.69 25.94 18.35 25.26
99th-100th 34.11 26.42 3.59 26.86 6.57 32.1436
Table 5: Variables responses to ﬁscal expansion over diﬀerent horizons. The responses are given as
average in percent per year using the discount rate of zero (no discounting).
Time 10 years 20 years 50 years
dC -0.06 -0.10 -0.06
dY 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dK 0.12 -0.06 -0.05
dCns 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dCs -0.14 -0.15 -0.08
Table 6: Variables responses to ﬁscal expansion over diﬀerent horizons for diﬀerent discount rates.
The responses are given as average in percent per year using various discount rates.
Time 10 years 20 years 50 years
r 0% 2% rk 0% 2% rk 0% 2% rk
dC -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
dY 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
dK 0.12 0.13 0.14 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.00
dCns 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
dCs -0.14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04
Table 7: Cross-sectional impact for diﬀerent wealth cohorts to baseline intervention scenario over
diﬀerent horizons.
q 1 ( l o w ) q 2q 3q 4 ( h i g h )
20 years
∆C -0.02% -0.03% -0.04% -0.17%
(eq. weighted %) 7.0% 11.1% 16.9% 65.0%
50 years
∆C -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.10%
(eq. weighted %) 8.8% 11.7% 16.5% 62.9%37
Table 8: Cross-sectional impact for diﬀerent age cohorts to baseline intervention scenario over
diﬀerent horizons.
Panel A
20-35 36-50 51-65 66-80
20 years
∆C -0.02% -0.04% -0.08% -0.15%
(eq. weighted %) 6.5% 14.2% 29.0% 50.3%
50 years
∆C -0.01% -0.02% -0.04% -0.08%
(eq. weighted %) 8.9% 13.6% 25.6% 51.9%
Panel B
30 45 60 75
∆C (15 years) -0.02% -0.07% -0.12% -0.17%
(eq. weighted %) 4.5% 18.5% 32.1% 44.9%
Table 9: Variables responses to ﬁscal expansion over diﬀerent horizons for longer intervention. The
responses are given as average in percent per year using the discount rate of zero (no discounting).
Intervention 10 Years Baseline (5 years)
Time 10 years 20 years 50 years 10 years 20 years 50 years
dC -0.05 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06
dY 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dK 0.34 -0.13 -0.13 0.12 -0.06 -0.05
dCns 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dCs -0.19 -0.31 -0.19 -0.14 -0.15 -0.0838
Table 10: Variables responses to ﬁscal expansion over diﬀerent horizons for lower foreign demand
for government bonds. The responses are given as average in percent per year using the discount
rate of zero (no discounting).
Foreign Demand 10% Baseline (25%)
Time 10 years 20 years 50 years 10 years 20 years 50 years
dC -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06
dY -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dK -0.11 -0.17 -0.08 0.12 -0.06 -0.05
dCns -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dCs -0.17 -0.16 -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.08
Table 11: Variables responses to ﬁscal expansion over diﬀerent horizons for larger increase in gov-
ernment debt. The responses are given as average in percent per year using the discount rate of
zero (no discounting).
Gov. Debt Increase 35% Baseline (25%)
Time 10 years 20 years 50 years 10 years 20 years 50 years
dC -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06
dY 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dK 0.21 -0.06 -0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.05
dCns 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
dCs -0.17 -0.19 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 -0.0839

















Figure 1: Consumption inequality over the life-cycle. The ﬁgure shows the cross-sectional gini
coeﬃcients for each age group.

















Figure 2: Wealth inequality over the life-cycle. The ﬁgure shows the cross-sectional gini coeﬃcients
for each age group.40























































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Impulse responses to ﬁscal intervention. Baseline scenario.41
















































































































Figure 4: Impulse responses to ﬁscal intervention. Solid line: longer intervention, dotted line:
shorter intervention